Mmastodon TechnologyCybersecurity first seen 2 h ago, last 2 h ago, peak #11
Researchers unveil audio covert channel crossing QEMU virtual machine boundaries
Original: New paper & PoC published: "The Invisible Wire: Bidirectional Audio Covert Channels Across VM Boundaries in Default QEMU
A new paper and proof-of-concept, "The Invisible Wire: Bidirectional Audio Covert Channels Across VM Boundaries in Default QEMU/KVM Deployments," has been published. The researchers show that with default virt-manager, SPICE, and PipeWire settings, an unprivileged host-side process can both sniff a virtual machine's audio output and inject audio into it, creating a two-way covert channel. The finding matters because it requires no custom configuration and highlights a gap in typical virtualization isolation assumptions.
Why now: Security researchers and virtualization users are discussing a newly disclosed side-channel that undermines assumed host-VM isolation in widely used default setups.
QEMUKVMSPICEPipeWirevirt-manager
Evidence
- New paper & PoC published: "The Invisible Wire: Bidirectional Audio Covert Channels Across VM Boundaries in Default QEMU/KVM Deployments" Using default virt-manager, SPICE, and PipeWire configurations, an unprivileged host-side process can sniff VM audio output and inject audio… · Cyberdevhq@infosec.exchange · 2
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